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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Innovation that excites.”1  “Think different.”2  “Progress through 
Technology.”3  Every day, consumers encounter flashy corporate slogans as 
companies compete to catch their attention—and their dollar.  In today’s 
innovative business climate the development and retention of intellectual 
property (IP) has emerged as a significant driver of economic success.  
According to the Global Intellectual Property Center, an affiliate of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, IP-intensive industries drive 74% of all United 
States exports (approximately $1 trillion),4 and corporations spend 
approximately $420 billion in research and development each year.5 
Patents are an incredibly valuable intellectual property asset, and they 
are not developed exclusively by large corporations.  From the labs of a 
biotechnology company to the research and development department of a 
tech start-up to a flash of brilliance in a Midwestern garage, the next big idea 
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 2.   Apple Steve Jobs the Crazy Ones, YOUTUBE (Feb. 1, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8rwsuXHA7RA. 
 3.   About Audi, AUDI OF AMERICA, https://www.audiusa.com/about (last visited Sept. 23, 
2016).  
 4.   Nam D. Pham, IP Creates Jobs for America, GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CTR. 2, 
http://image.uschamber.com/lib/fee913797d6303/m/1/IP+Creates+Jobs+-
+Executive+Summary+Web+-+2013.pdf. 
 5.   The Global Intellectual Property Center estimates the amount of money spent on research 
and development in each state.  This figure represents the aggregate amount spent in all states.  
Employing Innovation Across America, GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CTR., 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ip-employs-innovation (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
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could come from anywhere at any time.  After obtaining a patent, a common 
way to monetize the invention is through a patent licensing agreement. 
Many agreements include a royalty payment arrangement for the sale of 
products developed from the licensed patent.  In patent law, a patent grants 
the owner the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
patented technology.6  The owner possesses this power of exclusion for a 
statutory proscribed period (usually twenty years).7  However, after the 
statutory period has run, the use of the patented technology is released to the 
public.  Granting patent rights incentivize inventors to innovate, and the 
statutory limit ensures a limited monopoly power.  Antitrust concerns arise 
when a royalty arrangement continues in perpetuity beyond the expiration of 
the patent.  The seminal case regarding the legality of post-expiration 
royalties8 in patent licensing agreements is Brulotte v. Thys Co.9  In Brulotte, 
the Court held that post-expiration royalties were illegal per se due to the 
antitrust concern of extending the patent monopoly beyond its proscribed 
period.10 
Although the Brulotte decision received both judicial and industry 
criticism, the Supreme Court recently upheld the holding in Kimble v. 
Marvel Entertainment, LLC.11  In Kimble, the plaintiff, Stephen Kimble, 
licensed a patent to Marvel for what eventually became the Spider-Man Web 
Blaster toy.12  The plaintiff received an approximately $500,000 lump sum 
payment along with an agreement to receive 3% royalties for future sales of 
the toy,13 but no mention was made as to when the royalty payments would 
end.14  Marvel later became aware of the Brulotte decision and ceased 
payments to the plaintiff following the expiration of his patent.15  Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court found the Brulotte decision to be an exercise of statutory 
interpretation, upheld the per se ban under the doctrine of stare decisis, and 
directed critics of the ban to seek relief from Congress.16  The Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Kimble was incorrect because the Brulotte Court based 
                                                          
 6.   See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  
 7.   See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a), (c) (Supp. 2014). 
 8.   Post-expiration patent royalties are royalties paid to the licensor after the patent term has 
expired on the patent. 
 9.   Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
 10.   Id. at 32–34.  
 11.   Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).   
 12.   Id. at 2405–06. 
 13.   Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. at 2406; Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 858–59 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 14.   Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 15.   Id.  
 16.   Id. at 2414–15. 
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its ruling on antitrust concerns, not a statutory construction of the patent 
laws.  Upholding the per se ban on post-expiration royalties grossly intrudes 
on a patent holder’s freedom to contract, and is based on faulty economic 
theory.  As a result of this ruling, companies and individuals have two 
options when entering into long-term patent licensing agreements: (1) 
contract around the per se ban on post-expiration patent royalties or (2) 
pursue a new federal statute that overrules the Court’s decision.  
Continuously contracting around the per se ban is an economically 
inefficient option that could ultimately lead to important technological 
developments never making it to market.  Therefore, Congress should enact 
a new federal statute to govern patent licensing agreements that include post-
expiration royalties. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the background of the United States 
patent system and the bodies of law governing patent licensing agreements.  
Part II will also discuss the development of case law concerning post-
expiration royalties, and will examine the reasoning behind the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC.  Part III will 
outline the problems with the Court’s analysis in Kimble and the policy 
implications of upholding a per se ban on post-expiration royalties, and will 
propose a federal statute to instruct the courts how to evaluate the legality of 
such agreements.  Developing such a policy will abandon the unworkable 
and economically inefficient per se ban on post-expiration royalties while 
respecting the antitrust sentiments ingrained within the United States patent 
system. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the United States Patent System 
Earlier civilizations referenced patent-like rights, and the Venetian 
Senate developed the first patent system resembling our current law in the 
late fifteenth century with the 1474 Act.17  Because of the spread of trade, 
Italian merchants introduced the concept of patent protection to the rest of 
Europe.18  In the sixteenth century, Great Britain eventually began to 
recognize these patent rights as an incentive for foreign inventors to bring 
their new technologies and skills to England.19 
                                                          
 17.   ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
123–24 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) (“The term ‘patent’—from the Latin patere (to be 
open), referring to an open letter of privilege from the sovereign—originated in this period.”).  
 18.   Id. at 124.   
 19.   Id.  
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By the early seventeenth century, under Elizabeth I, the common law 
established that the crown should decide when to grant patent monopoly 
rights for inventions.20  Conditions were imposed upon inventors who 
wished to receive patents for their inventions.21  James I continued this 
practice, but a perception that the king gave preferential treatment to his 
companions and advisors led to a host of complaints.22  Both inventions and 
particular industries obtained patent rights in England.23 
Members of Parliament operated within many of the industries 
selectively granted patent rights, which resulted in injuries to their 
businesses,24 and the public became increasingly outraged over the “odious 
monopolies.”25  In response, Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies in 
1624, which directed the courts “to review all privileges granted by the 
crown and outlaw[] all but those based on true inventions.”26  By passing 
this piece of legislation, Parliament recognized patent rights in a limited 
sense for the purpose of encouraging innovation and balanced antitrust 
concerns with economic incentives.27 
The establishment of the American colonies brought with it British 
common law legal traditions, including patent law.28  Originally, the 
individual states issued patents, which led to numerous conflicts.29  In order 
to quell the increasing litigation, the Constitutional Convention of 1789 
included a discussion regarding the creation of a United States patent 
system.30  The Framers ultimately included a provision in Article 1, Section 
8 of the United States Constitution to authorize Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”31  This marked the beginning of a patent system in the United 
                                                          
 20.   Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 852–54, 870 (1994) (“The term 
‘invention’ meant the establishment of a new trade or industry, either through importation or through 
actual discovery of new technology.”). 
 21.   Id. at 870–71 (Novelty was required, “but only in the sense that the ‘invention’ had not 
been worked in England within living memory.”). 
 22.   MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 124. 
 23.   Id.  “Running ale-houses” were an example of an industry given preferential treatment.  Id. 
 24.   Id. 
 25.   Walterscheid, supra note 20, at 872.  
 26.   MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 124–25. 
 27.   Id. at 125. 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   Id.  One notable disagreement between states centered around steamboat patents.  Id. 
 30.   Id. at 125–26. 
 31.   U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.   
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States that has undergone numerous changes through the years.32 
Under current United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
regulations, so long as the inventor meets all the statutory requirements,33 he 
or she obtains an exclusive right to exclude others from using, making, or 
selling the patented invention for an express statutory period.34  Once the 
statutory period has run, the invention is released to the public and free to 
use.35 
B. Patent Licensing Agreements 
When an inventor is granted a patent by the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), he or she has the right to exclude “any subsequent developer, 
including a completely independent inventor, from using the same 
invention . . . .”36  Some inventors do not wish (or do not have the financial 
resources) to develop, market and sell their technology or inventions 
themselves, and must instead confer their rights to another party by way of 
an exclusive or non-exclusive license.37  Such agreements incorporate 
principles of patent law, contract law, and antitrust law.38 
                                                          
 32.   Thomas Jefferson was one of the key drafters of the original patent statute in 1790, which 
was the first draft of patent laws in the United States.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 17, at 126.  The 
1790 Act was “substituted for the pro forma registration system of the 1793 Act.”  Id.  In the mid-
nineteenth century, the patent system was changed to include “what is now called nonobviousness” 
as another requirement for patentability.  Id.  The next major revision was the 1952 Patent Act, 
which enforced the favorability of patentability after “the nation threw all available resources into 
the war effort, [and] the armed forces called on engineers and scientists to perfect a vast array of new 
technologies in short order.”  Id. at 127.  The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was the next major 
patent law reform, and was signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2011.  See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act Implementation, UNITED STATES PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/leahy-smith-america-invents-act-implementation 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2016).  
 33.   Statutory requirements for patentability include utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and 
enablement.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012).   
 34.   See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a), (c) (Supp. 2014).  
 35.   Id.   
 36.   ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 1.01 (Matthew Bender, 
rev. ed. 2016).   
 37.   JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1A.01 (2016) (“[W]hether a 
license is exclusive or nonexclusive is one of the most important scope terms.  Only if the license is 
nonexclusive can the licensor make more money by selling precisely the same thing—a 
nonexclusive license of the same rights in the same subject matter—to multiple parties.  If the 
license is exclusive, the licensor can multiply its revenue streams only by limiting each license, for 
example, to a specified field of use.”). 
 38.   Id. (“[T]he explosion in commercial exploitation and licensing of intellectual property 
since the 1970s has begun to produce a body of what might loosely be called the contract law of 
licensing.”).  
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1. Patent Assignment vs. Patent License 
Patent agreements can be viewed as one of two distinct forms of 
contracts: assignments or licenses.39  When a transferor assigns a patent to 
another individual or corporation he or she “gives the transferee the right to 
sue for infringement, since title to the whole or undivided part of the patent 
is deemed to have passed.”40  The Supreme Court case Waterman v. 
Mackenzie summarized the difference between an assignment and a license: 
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant, 
and convey, either (1) the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right 
to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or 
(2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or (3) the 
exclusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part 
of the United States.  A transfer of either of these three kinds of 
interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee 
a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers.  In 
the second case, jointly with the assignor.  In the first and third cases, in 
the name of the assignee alone.  Any assignment or transfer, short of 
one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in the patent, 
and no right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement.41 
In Kimble, the case at issue in this Note, the question was not whether 
the patent agreement was an assignment or license.42  If Kimble and Marvel 
constructed an assignment agreement, Marvel would have purchased the full 
rights to the patent with no continuing obligation to pay Kimble.  The 
agreement, instead, tethered Kimble and Marvel together by including 
“running royalties,” thus “tak[ing] on some relational aspect” distinctive of a 
licensing agreement.43 
2. Controlling Law Governing Patent Licensing Agreements 
While state law usually governs contractual agreements, patent licensing 
                                                          
 39.   HAROLD EINHORN & ERIC E. BENSEN, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS § 1.01 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016).  
 40.   Id. at § 1.01(1)(b).  
 41.   Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (citations omitted).  
 42.   See generally Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).  
 43.  EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 39, at § 1.01 (“A simple single payment assignment is, for 
example, a transactional contract.  However, when a license is entered into with running royalties, 
the contract takes on some relational aspect since there is a continuing reporting and payment 
relationship.  Even more relational is a license with running royalties and a continuing flow of 
improvements.  There is in fact a spectrum in licenses from simple transactional agreements to those 
which are highly relational (such as joint research agreements).”). 
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agreements are controlled by relevant federal law.44  Patent licensing 
agreements that extend beyond the scope of the patent expiration date are the 
focus of this Note.  As such, these types of agreements have antitrust law 
considerations and express statutory provisions governing patent 
expiration,45 which puts them firmly in the federal realm.46 
The pertinent patent law principles center on the expiration of the 
licensed patent.  As noted above, there are express statutory provisions that 
govern the lifetime of a patent.47  Utility48 and plant49 patents are generally 
granted a patent term of twenty years, while design patents50 are granted a 
shorter term of fifteen years.51  While there are certainly more patent law 
conflicts that may arise within licensing agreements (infringement, validity, 
etc.), the scope of this Note does not bring them into focus. 
3. Patents & Antitrust Concerns 
A patent is a monopoly granted to the inventor for a statutorily defined 
period of time, and “the mere acquisition of patent rights” through a patent 
licensing agreement does not invoke antitrust violations.52  Once the patent 
expires, it is released to the public for all to use, thus terminating the 
monopoly.53  Antitrust considerations heavily influence patent licensing 
transactions as well as the United States patent law system as a whole.  The 
original concern and distrust of antitrust activity led to the Statute of 
Monopolies,54 and the United States echoed similar antitrust sentiments with 
the Sherman Act in 1890.55  The Sherman Act was “the first modern 
                                                          
 44.   DRATLER, supra note 37, at § 1A.02 (“[T]he Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution lets federal law trump state law whenever the two conflict.”). 
 45.   See supra notes 31–35.   
 46.   DRATLER, supra note 37, at § 1A.02 (“The broadest field in which supervening federal 
policy imparts licensing agreements as such is that of federal antitrust law . . . .”).  
 47.   See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.   
 48.   A utility patent is a patent granted for an invention that is a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).   
 49.   Plant patents are available for the invention or discovery of a new and distinct variety of 
asexually reproducing plants.  35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012).  
 50.   A design patent is a patent granted for a “new, original and ornamental design for an 
article of manufacture . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012).   
 51.   35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012).  
 52.   EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 39, at § 7.01.  
 53.   DRATLER, supra note 37, at § 6.02 (citations omitted) (“Patents were exempted from the 
original Statute of Monopolies, just as they are excluded from antitrust scrutiny today, for one reason 
only.  They encourage the innovation that fuels the fires of competition and enriches the public 
domain once the patents expire.  The exemption of patents as good monopolies thus encourages 
development of products and processes that are ultimately superadded to the common store.”). 
 54.   See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 55.   DRATLER, supra note 37, at § 5.02.  
184 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
antitrust statute . . . [and] laid the foundation for all of antitrust . . . law 
today.”56  It is considered unique due to its brevity relative to other United 
States statutes, with its interpretation delegated largely to the courts.57  The 
major components of the Sherman Act expressly condemn both the restraint 
of trade58 and monopolies.59 
While the Sherman Act was an effort to restrict monopolization and 
encourage competition, its provisions do not explicitly instruct “what 
conduct is permitted and what is not.”60  Thus, “antitrust law in the United 
States . . . is largely judge-made law.”61  The courts raise these antitrust 
concerns when royalty provisions in the patent licensing agreement extend 
beyond the expiration date of the patent, and, as a result, have looked 
unfavorably upon such agreements. 
C. Per Se Ban of Post-Expiration Royalties 
1. Early Decisions 
The issue of post-expiration royalties in patent licensing agreements is a 
relatively recent development.62  The first appearance of the issue was in 
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co., when Chief Justice Stone 
wrote, “any attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those 
claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, 
whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose 
of the patent laws.”63  The Third Circuit followed similar reasoning in 1959.  
In American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp.,64 the court held that it 
was patent abuse for a multi-patent license agreement to include a provision 
that continued royalty payments until all patents in the agreement expired.65 
The Third Circuit revisited this reasoning in 1962 in a case that involved 
a patent license containing a single patent.  In Ar-Tik Systems, Inc. v. Dairy 
Queen, Inc., the plaintiff entered into a patent licensing agreement with the 
                                                          
 56.   Id.  
 57.   Id.  
 58.   15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be illegal.”). 
 59.   Id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
 60.   DRATLER, supra note 37, at § 5.02.  
 61.   Id.  
 62.   EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 39, at § 7.06.  
 63.   Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945). 
 64.   Am. Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959). 
 65.   Id. at 777.   
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defendant to allow the defendant “to use and to permit others to use [the 
plaintiff’s patented] frozen dessert machine.”66  Utilizing the Supreme 
Court’s language in Scott Paper Co. and the Third Circuit’s holding 
American Securit Co., the court held that the “patent monopoly was spent” 
upon expiration of the patent in question and that “[a]n attempt to extend 
that monopoly by the exaction of royalties thereafter was unenforceable.”67  
Post-expiration patent royalties invoked significant antitrust concerns in 
these early court decisions, concerns that ultimately made their way to the 
Supreme Court. 
2. Supreme Court Precedent 
The issue of post-expiration patent royalties, and the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning for its ban, was first reviewed by the Supreme Court in Brulotte v. 
Thys Co.68  In Brulotte, the plaintiff, Thys Company, licensed to the 
defendants, multiple hop farmers, a hop-picking machine that incorporated 
seven of the plaintiff’s patents for a specified royalty structure.69  Even 
though all of the patents expired by 1957, the licensing agreement provided 
for continued royalty payments.70  The plaintiff brought suit for the 
defendants’ refusal to adhere to the contractually agreed upon royalty 
structure “both before and after the expiration of the patents.”71  The 
Supreme Court adopted similar reasoning as the preceding cases, and Justice 
Douglas highlighted significant antitrust concerns: 
[W]e conclude that a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects 
beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.  If that 
device were available to patentees, the free market visualized for the 
post-expiration period would be subject to monopoly influences that 
have no proper place there. 
. . . . 
 A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can 
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.  But to use that leverage 
to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is 
                                                          
 66.   Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496, 497 (3d Cir. 1962). 
 67.   Id. at 510.   
 68.   EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 39, at § 7.06.  
 69.   Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 29–30 (1964) (“Under that license there is payable a 
minimum royalty of $500 for each hop-picking season or $3.33 1/3 per 200 pounds of dried hops 
harvested by the machine, whichever is greater.”). 
 70.   Id. at 30. 
 71.   Id.  
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analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing72 
[sic] the sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of 
unpatented ones.73 
Keeping in line with anti-monopoly motivations, the decision in 
Brulotte established a per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent 
licensing agreements.74 
For licensing agreements that involve a single patent, this per se rule is 
straightforward: no patent royalties beyond the expiration date of the patent.  
However, many licensing agreements can include a large number of 
patents—especially in the medical and biotech research fields.  Following 
the Brulotte decision, circuit courts heard cases on the issue of patent 
licensing agreements that encompass multiple patents, and held that “the law 
regarding post-expiration royalties [in this case] is in a fluid state.”75  The 
lower courts ultimately have affirmed the Brulotte decision, though not 
without significant criticism.76 
                                                          
 72.   “A seller’s agreement to sell one product or service only if the buyer also buys a different 
product or service; a seller’s refusal to sell one product or service unless the buyer also buys a 
different product or service.”  Tying Arrangement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 73.   Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32–33 (emphasis added).  
 74.   Id.  
 75.   EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 39, at § 7.06. 
In view of the foregoing discussion of the most recent cases in point, however, the 
following conclusions may be drawn: 
  (1) A patent owner should make no license agreement, even though a potential 
licensee is willing, under which the royalty for a single patent is payable beyond its 
expiration date or under which the royalty for a group of patents is payable beyond the 
expiration date of the last to expire. 
  (2) Special precautions must be taken whenever a patent owner enters a license 
agreement in which one or more, but not all, patents will expire during the license term. 
At the very least, coercion should be avoided. Perhaps the safest procedure following the 
expiration of a key licensed patent is to give the licensee the right to terminate the 
agreement and the option to take a license at a reasonable, negotiated royalty on the 
unexpired patents which remain.  
  (3) Alternatively, the licensor should consider offering a package wherein the licensee 
pays a major proportion of the royalty rate for the first patent, and then increasing 
amounts for the second, third, or more patents under which he desires to operate. The 
licensor should not condition the grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties on 
products that do not use the teaching. Conditioning consists of a patentee’s insistence on 
a percentage-of-sales royalty, regardless of use, and his rejection of licensee proposals to 
pay only for actual use. In order to find conditioning under a “total sales” provision, a 
patent licensor must have (1) insisted upon or demanded the payment of royalties on 
merchandise which the licensor clearly knew did not employ the discovery which the 
claims of the patent define and (2) rejected licensee proposals to pay only for actual use.  
Id. 
 76.   Id.  
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3. Criticism of Brulotte 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, specifically Judge Posner, has 
been critical of the reasoning in Brulotte.77  In USM Corp. v. SPS 
Technologies, Inc., Judge Posner was skeptical that post-expiration royalties 
extended a patent holder’s patent rights.78  Specifically, he wrote: 
one might question whether any of these practices really “extends” the 
patent.  The patentee who insists on limiting the freedom of his 
purchaser or licensee—whether to price, to use complimentary inputs 
of the purchaser’s choice, or to make competing items—will have to 
compensate the purchaser for the restriction by charging a lower price 
for the use of the patent.79 
Judge Posner revisited this issue in detail in 2002.80 
In Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc., the defendant, Dolby 
Laboratories, cited Brulotte’s decision as its main argument for halting 
payment of royalties for any patents in the agreement beyond their 
expiration date.81  Finding Brulotte to be on point, Judge Posner began by 
noting the ample criticism Brulotte has received.82  He disagreed with the 
finding that post-expiration royalties “extends the patent beyond the term 
fixed in the patent statute . . . .”83  Judge Posner noted that the goal of patent 
expiration was to end the right of the patent holder to exclude others from 
using the patent, and wrote that in licensing agreements “[a]fter the patent 
expires, anyone can make the patented process or product without being 
guilty of patent infringement. . . .  Expiration thus accomplishes what it is 
supposed to accomplish.”84  Judge Posner acknowledged that criticism of the 
Brulotte decision would be unwarranted if the decision resulted from 
construction of the Article 1, Section 8 provision of the Constitution or a 
patent statute, but noted instead that the decision “seem[ed] rather to have 
been a free-floating product of a misplaced fear of monopoly . . . that was 
not even tied to one of the antitrust statutes.”85  While Judge Posner clearly 
                                                          
 77.   See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 1982).  See also 
Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–19 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 78.   USM Corp., 694 F.2d at 510–11.  
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1014.  
 81.   Id. at 1016–17. 
 82.   Id. at 1017 (“[Brulotte] has, it is true, been severely, and as it seems to us, with all due 
respect, justly, criticized . . . .”). 
 83.   Id. 
 84.   Id.  
 85.   Id. at 1018 (citations omitted).   
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disagreed with the Brulotte reasoning,86 he explained that the doctrine of 
stare decisis prevented the court from overturning the decision.87 
Outside of the court system, contemporary commentators have also 
criticized Brulotte as a decision based upon an unfounded fear of patent 
monopoly extension: 
 The Brulotte rule incorrectly assumes that a patent license has 
significance after the patent terminates.  When the patent term ends, the 
exclusive right to make, use or sell the licensed invention also ends.  
Because the invention is available to the world, the license in fact 
ceases to have value.  Presumably, licensees know this when they enter 
into a licensing agreement.  If the licensing agreement calls for royalty 
payments beyond the patent term, the parties base those payments on 
the licensees’ assessment of the value of the license during the patent 
period.  These payments, therefore, do not represent an extension in 
time of the patent monopoly. 
. . . . 
. . . Courts do not remove the obligation of the consignee to pay 
because payment after receipt is an extension of market power—it is 
simply a division of the payment-for-delivery transaction.  Royalties 
beyond the patent term are no different.  If royalties are calculated on 
post-patent term sales, the calculation is simply a risk-shifting credit 
arrangement between patentee and licensee.  The arrangement can be 
no more than that, because the patentee at that time has nothing else to 
sell.88 
Courts have developed some ways to bypass the Brulotte decision and 
upheld agreements that differentiate pre- and post-expiration royalty 
payments, but many industries have still found this alternative to be 
inadequate.89  The per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent 
agreements endured, and was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in June 
2015.90 
                                                          
 86.   Id. at 1020 (“Thus, as these cases and a tidal wave of legal and economic scholarship point 
out, the idea that you can use tying to lever your way to a second (or, in the post-expiration patent 
royalty setting, a longer and therefore greater) monopoly is economic nonsense, imputing systematic 
irrationality to businessmen.”).  
 87.   Id. at 1018 (“However, we have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no 
matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s 
current thinking the decision seems.”).  
 88.   Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The Patent Royalty Term and 
Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 814, 851 (1990).  
 89.   Scott W. Doyle et al., Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale, LAW360 
(June 23, 2015, 6:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule-upheld-despite-
suspect-economic-rationale.  
 90.   See generally Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015). 
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4. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC 
In Kimble, the Supreme Court revisited the Brulotte per se ban on post-
expiration royalties in patent licensing agreements.91  Kimble was an 
individual inventor who patented a toy that allowed children to pretend they 
had Spider-Man’s powers by shooting string from an apparatus attached to 
their hand.92  He brought this technology to Marvel (maker of many Spider-
Man products) hoping to work out a deal for the sale or license of his 
invention.93  Following the meeting, Marvel began marketing a toy dubbed 
the “Web Blaster,” which closely resembled Kimble’s patented idea.94  A 
patent infringement suit followed, which resulted in a settlement in the form 
of a licensing agreement for Kimble’s patent that paid a lump sum plus “a 
3% royalty on Marvel’s future sales of the Web Blaster and similar 
products.”95  There was no time limit placed on the payment of royalties in 
the agreement.96 
Marvel later learned of the holding in Brulotte, and obtained a 
declaratory judgment in 2010 that allowed them to cease royalty payments 
following the expiration of Kimble’s patent.97  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court ruling,98 but not without ample criticism 
of Brulotte’s reasoning: “[T]he Brulotte rule is counterintuitive and its 
rationale is arguably unconvincing.  Nonetheless, recognizing that we are 
bound by Supreme Court authority and the strong interest in maintaining 
national uniformity on patent law issues, we have reluctantly applied the 
rule.”99  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine whether Brulotte 
should be overturned.100 
a. Industry Involvement 
The grant of certiorari received considerable attention from many 
intellectual property groups, professional organizations, and other entities 
with a total of twenty amici curiae briefs subsequently filed: nine supporting 
                                                          
 91.   Id. at 2404. 
 92.   Id. at 2405–06.  
 93.   Id. at 2406. 
 94.   Id.  
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158, 1161–62 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 98.   Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 99.   Id. at 857 (citations omitted). 
 100.   Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct.  2406. 
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Kimble,101 five supporting Marvel,102 and six supporting neither party.103  A 
variety of parties filed amici briefs, including medical schools, 
biotechnology companies, medical research centers, and public interest and 
intellectual property research groups.104 
Generally, the amici briefs in support of Kimble argued that the Brulotte 
per se ban (1) increases the cost and complexity of constructing intellectual 
                                                          
 101.   See generally Brief of BioTime, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kimble 
v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter BioTime Amicus]; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Center for Intellectual Property Research of the Indiana University Maurer School of 
Law & Other Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 
(2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter Indiana University Amicus 1]; Brief of Memorial Sloan-Kettering 
Cancer Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 
S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720), 2015 WL 673668 [hereinafter Memorial Sloan Amicus 1]; Brief of 
the University of Massachusetts Biologic Laboratories as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter University of 
Massachusetts Amicus]; Brief for Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720), 2014 
WL 768320 [hereinafter Memorial Sloan Amicus 2]; Brief of the Intellectual Property Law Ass’n of 
Chicago as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. 
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Law 
Association Amicus]; Brief of Amici Curiae for the Center for Intellectual Property Research of the 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law & Other Legal & Economic Scholars in Support of 
Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter 
Indiana University Amicus 2]; Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Ass’n 
(NYIPLA) in Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 
13-720) [hereinafter New York IP Law Amicus]; Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n in 
Support of Petitioners, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) 
[hereinafter IP Owners Amicus]. 
 102.   See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual 
Property Institute in Support of Respondents, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 
(2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter William Mitchell Amicus]; Brief of Washington Legal Foundation 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) 
(No. 13-720) [hereinafter Washington Legal Foundation Amicus]; Brief of Public Knowledge as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) 
(No. 13-720) [hereinafter Public Knowledge Amicus]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) 
[hereinafter United States Amicus]; Brief of Nautilus, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720) [hereinafter 
Nautilus Amicus].  
 103.   See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae the Licensing Executives Society (U.S.A. & 
Canada), Inc. in Support of Neither Party, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) 
(No. 13-720); Brief of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Brief of the 
American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kimble v. 
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Brief of the 
Intellectual Property Law Ass’n of Chicago as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kimble v. 
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720); Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Robin 
Feldman, Professor Alice Armitage, & the U.C. Hastings Institute for Innovation Law on Behalf of 
Neither Party, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720). 
 104.   See supra notes 101–103.   
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property license agreements,105 (2) is not in line with current Court rulings 
and decisions,106 (3) ignores the economic benefits of post-expiration 
royalties,107 (4) damages public welfare in regard to scientific medical 
research,108 and (5) exposes unsophisticated or unknowledgeable parties to 
unjust results.109  The amici briefs argued that a rule-of-reason approach 
should replace the per se ban.110  Rule of reason is the default approach used 
by the courts for cases resulting from antitrust allegations.111  The rule-of-
reason approach directs the trier of fact to “decide whether the questioned 
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors, including specific information about the 
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, 
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”112 
Conversely, the amici briefs supporting Marvel argued (1) the Courts 
have continuously upheld Brulotte,113 (2) a rule-of-reason approach would 
not prevent patent abuse and is inappropriate in these cases,114 (3) the 
doctrine of stare decisis discourages overturning decisions based on the 
construction of federal statutes,115 and (4) Brulotte does not obstruct contract 
negotiations or have any negative impact on the economy.116  The three 
remaining neutral amici briefs argued both sides’ points.117 
b. The Supreme Court Upholds Brulotte 
Before the Court, Kimble first argued that the Brulotte per se ban on 
post-expiration royalties should be discarded and replaced by a rule-of-
reason approach.118  A rule of reason would have the Court utilize a 
“flexible, case-by-case analysis” when evaluating patent licensing 
                                                          
 105.   BioTime Amicus, supra note 101, at 3–9; Memorial Sloan Amicus 1, supra note 101, at 23–
25. 
 106.   Indiana University Amicus 1, supra note 101, at 12–20; Memorial Sloan Amicus 1, supra 
note 101, at 19–23; University of Massachusetts Amicus, supra note 101, at 27–35. 
 107.   Memorial Sloan Amicus 1, supra note 101, at 17–18, 21–24. 
 108.   Id. at 9–15. 
 109.   University of Massachusetts Amicus, supra note 101, at 33–35.  
 110.   BioTime Amicus, supra note 101, at 2–3; Memorial Sloan Amicus 1, supra note 101 at 19–
23; University of Massachusetts Amicus, supra note 101, at 22.  
 111.   State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 112.   Id. (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)). 
 113.   William Mitchell Amicus, supra note 102, at 9–14; Washington Legal Foundation Amicus, 
supra note 102, at 9–13.  
 114.   Public Knowledge Amicus, supra note 102, at 2–22. 
 115.   Washington Legal Foundation Amicus, supra note 102, at 9–17. 
 116.   Id. at 17–21. 
 117.   See generally supra note 103.   
 118.   Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408 (2015). 
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agreements similar to the approach in antitrust law.119  Specifically, Kimble 
highlighted the need for the Court to examine (through a variety of factors) 
whether the patentee truly had the power and ability to actually extend their 
patent rights in the marketplace and “curtail competition.”120 
Kimble next argued that the Brulotte rule was based on the faulty 
economic theory that license agreements including post-expiration royalties 
“are invariably anticompetitive.”121  He pointed out that longer payback 
periods usually result in lower royalty rates, which in turn lowers retail 
prices.122  Lower rates paid back to the patentee, Kimble argued, “enable 
more companies to afford a license, fostering competition among the 
patent’s own users.”123  Further, Kimble noted that, unless there was a 
barrier for other companies to enter the market, the post-expiration royalty 
structure actually “encourages new companies to begin making the product” 
by offering a lower price to attract consumers.124 
The Court did not delve into the economic argument put forth by 
Kimble because it said Brulotte was not an antitrust case: 
 We do not join issue with Kimble’s economics—only with what 
follows from it.  A broad scholarly consensus supports Kimble’s view 
of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties, and we see no 
error in that shared analysis. . . . 
 If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might 
answer both questions as Kimble would like. . . . 
. . .  Brulotte did not hinge on the mistake Kimble identifies. . . .  [I]n 
deciding whether post-expiration royalties comport with patent law, 
Brulotte did not undertake to assess that practice’s likely competitive 
effects.  Instead, it applied a categorical principle that all patents, and 
all benefits from them, must end when their terms expire.125 
Finally, Kimble argued that a per se ban on post-expiration royalties 
have a harmful effect on innovation and the economy as a whole.126  He 
posited that the per se ban would prevent parties from entering into ideal 
                                                          
 119.   Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 45, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 
(2015) (No. 13-720)). 
 120.   Id. at 2408–09.  
 121.   Id. at 2412 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 37, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 
2401 (2015) (No. 13-720)). 
 122.   Id. 
 123.   Id. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Id. at 2412–13 (citations omitted). 
 126.   Id. at 2414. 
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long-term contracts that mitigate risk.127  Preventing such contracts could 
prevent parties from reaching any sort of agreement and bar innovative 
technologies from the market altogether.128  The Court was not convinced, 
and cited the lack of empirical evidence supporting Kimble’s argument.129 
Ultimately, the Court, in a six-to-three decision written by Justice 
Kagan, found the doctrine of stare decisis was too great to overturn and 
replace the Brulotte decision with the rule of reason.130  The Court found 
that precedent carries extra weight when the Court performs statutory 
construction, which is what the Court did in Brulotte.131  Justice Kagan 
noted that Congress had the ability to make changes to relevant statutes once 
the Court interprets them, and in this case Congress had not replaced the 
Brulotte per se ban despite “repeatedly amend[ing] the patent laws” since 
that decision.132  Further, the Court believed the rule-of-reason alternative 
would provide a less-workable alternative to the per se ban, and as such “the 
case for sticking with long-settled precedent [grew] stronger.”133  The Court 
did acknowledge the merits of Kimble’s economic arguments, and noted the 
strength of the support of the various amici briefs: “A broad scholarly 
consensus supports Kimble’s view of the competitive effects of post-
expiration royalties, and we see no error in that shared analysis.”134 
However, the Court found that this was not an antitrust case, but one 
based on a statutory construction of patent law.135  Since the Court viewed 
Brulotte as an exercise in statutory interpretation, the Court did not explore 
the substantive economic arguments.136  As a result, even while recognizing 
the validity of Kimble’s complaints, the Court affirmed the Brulotte per se 
ban on post-expiration royalties, and instructed opponents of the per se ban 
to seek the desired changes from Congress.137 
                                                          
 127.   Id. 
 128.   Id. 
 129.   Id. (“Neither Kimble nor his amici have offered any empirical evidence connecting 
Brulotte to decreased innovation; they essentially ask us to take their word for the problem.”). 
 130.   Id. at 2409–12 (“[A]n argument that we got something wrong—even a good argument to 
that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.”). 
 131.   Id. at 2409. 
 132.   Id. at 2410. 
 133.   Id. at 2411. 
 134.   Id. at 2412. 
 135.   Id. at 2413. 
 136.   Id. at 2414 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 
(2014)) (“Truth be told, if forced to decide [whether Brulotte has caused economic harm], we would 
not know where or how to start.  Which is one good reason why that is not our job.  Claims that a 
statutory precedent has ‘serious and harmful consequences’ for innovation are (to repeat this 
opinion’s refrain) ‘more appropriately addressed to Congress.’”). 
 137.   Id. (citations omitted) (“Congress legislates actively with respect to patents, considering 
concerns of just the kind Kimble raises.  In adhering to our precedent as against such complaints, we 
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c. A Super-Powered Dissent 
Justice Alito delivered a dissent in Kimble that attacked the majority for 
“employ[ing] stare decisis, normally a tool of restraint, to reaffirm a clear 
case of judicial overreach.”138  He wrote that Brulotte was in no way a 
construction of patent laws, and was clearly based on bad economic 
theory.139  In support of this point, Justice Alito noted that there is absolutely 
nothing in the Patent Act that prevents post-expiration royalties, and that the 
majority did not even try to show that Brulotte utilized statutory 
construction.140  As a result, Justice Alito viewed Brulotte as “a bald act of 
policymaking.”141 
Next, the dissent critiqued the antitrust concerns expressed by Brulotte 
and affirmed by the majority.142  Citing scholarly articles and other Supreme 
Court decisions, Justice Alito wrote that post-expiration royalties do not 
extend a patent monopoly143 and can actually have positive “pro-competitive 
effects.”144  In fact, the dissent explained that positive and efficient 
economic results can come from “spreading licensing fees over longer 
periods” and that Brulotte’s per se ban on these licensing agreements results 
in economic inefficiency.145 
The majority explained that there are workarounds to the Brulotte per se 
ban “enabling [parties] to achieve those same ends,”146 but the dissent aptly 
responded by arguing, “the need to avoid Brulotte is an economic 
inefficiency in itself.”147  To further his point, Justice Alito cited Supreme 
Court decisions that “abandoned per se rules [in patent law and other areas] 
                                                          
promote the rule-of-law values to which courts must attend while leaving matters of public policy to 
Congress.”). 
 138.   Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 139.   Id. (“That decision was not based on anything that can plausibly be regarded as an 
interpretation of the terms of the Patent Act.  It was based instead on an economic theory—and one 
that has been debunked.”). 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. (“[Brulotte] was not simply a case of incorrect statutory interpretation.  It was not 
really statutory interpretation at all.”). 
 142.   Id. at 2415–16. 
 143.   Id. at 2416 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
953, 955 (2005)) (“Instead, ‘[o]nce the patent term expires, the power to exclude is gone,’ and all 
that is left ‘is a problem about optimal contract design.’”). 
 144.   Id. at 2415–16 (“Not only was Brulotte based on policymaking, it was based on a policy 
that is difficult to defend.  Indeed, in the intervening 50 years, its reasoning has been soundly 
refuted.”). 
 145.   Id. at 2416. 
 146.   Id. at 2408 (majority opinion).  
 147.   Id. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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with similarly disruptive effects.”148 
The dissent also wrote that the Brulotte rule frustrated contractual 
expectations of the two parties to the licensing agreement.149  Both parties 
agreed on the royalty structure in the agreement, and intended for the 
payments to continue for as long as Marvel sold their Web Blaster toy based 
on Kimble’s invention.150  The majority argued, “[s]o long as we see a 
reasonable possibility that parties have structured their business transactions 
in light of Brulotte, we have one more reason to let it stand.”151  Justice Alito 
responded by stating, “there is no real uncertainty” as to whether or not 
Marvel intended Brulotte to be the default rule when it contracted with 
Kimble, and, alternatively, “[w]hat we know for sure . . . is that Brulotte has 
upended the parties’ expectations here and in many other cases.”152 
The majority’s prescribed solution for critics of their decision was to 
turn to Congress for a law allowing post-expiration royalties.153  However, 
the dissent warned “[p]assing legislation is no easy task.”154  Ultimately, 
Justice Alito wrote that upholding Brulotte’s per se ban on post-expiration 
royalties was based on nothing more than inappropriately adhering to the 
doctrine of stare decisis: 
 In the end, Brulotte’s only virtue is that we decided it.  But that does 
not render it invincible. . . . 
 Our traditional approach to stare decisis does not require us to retain 
Brulotte’s per se rule.  Brulotte’s holding had no basis in the law.  Its 
reasoning has been thoroughly disproved.  It poses economic barriers 
that stifle innovation.  And it unsettles contractual expectations. 
. . . . 
                                                          
 148.   Id. at 2415 (citing Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)).  
 149.   Id. at 2417 (“[B]oth sides expected the royalty payments to continue until Marvel stopped 
selling toys that fit the terms of the agreement.  But that is not what happened.  When Marvel 
discovered Brulotte, it used that decision to nullify a key part of the agreement.  The parties’ 
contractual expectations were shattered, and petitioners’ rights were extinguished.”).  
 150.   Id. 
 151.   Id. at 2410 (majority opinion). 
 152.   Id. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
 153.   Id. at 2414–15 (majority opinion).  
 154.   Id. at 2418–19 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“A federal statute must withstand 
the ‘finely wrought’ procedure of bicameralism and presentment.  Within that onerous process, there 
are additional practical hurdles.  A law must be taken up for discussion and not passed over in favor 
of more pressing matters, and Senate rules require 60 votes to end debate on most legislation.  And 
even if the House and Senate agree on a general policy, the details of the measure usually must be 
hammered out in a conference committee and repassed by both Houses.”); see also SCHOOLHOUSE 
ROCK, I’m Just a Bill, YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0.  
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 Even taking the Court on its own terms, Brulotte was an antitrust 
decision masquerading as a patent case.155 
The majority improperly adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis, which 
reinforced a rule that results in economic inefficiency, decreases innovation, 
and frustrates the contractual intentions of parties.  Parties must now either 
expend considerable resources contracting around the per se ban, or pursue 
legislative action in Congress. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent licensing 
agreements is a rigid rule that cuts against the main goals of the patent 
system by promoting economic inefficiency and diminishing innovation.  
Because of this ruling, parties must work around the rule when they contract 
to protect their future economic interests.  This economic inefficient strategy 
should not endure.  A federal statute utilizing a rule-of-reason approach 
should govern patent licensing agreements with post-expiration royalties.  
The rule-of-reason approach would empower courts to factually investigate a 
patent licensing agreement for anti-competitive effects and extension of the 
patent monopoly beyond the expiration date. 
A. Critique of the Supreme Court’s Rationale 
The Supreme Court refused to delve into the economic and policy 
arguments offered by Kimble because they incorrectly interpreted Brulotte 
as an exercise in statutory construction.  Had the Court recognized the 
complete absence of canons of statutory construction and ubiquitous 
antitrust considerations, they would have been able to fully consider 
Kimble’s economic arguments.  Recognizing Brulotte as an antitrust case 
would have enabled the Court to use the rule-of-reason approach in 
evaluating Kimble’s arguments, and would have likely overturned Brulotte’s 
per se ban on post-expiration patent royalties. 
1. Brulotte Did Not Utilize Any Canons of Statutory Construction and 
Explicitly Cited Antitrust Concerns as the Basis for the Per Se Ban. 
The Supreme Court upheld Brulotte because stare decisis is a stronger 
force when the Court interprets a statute.156  In fact, the majority admitted 
                                                          
 155.   Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 156.   Id. at 2409–10, 2415 (majority opinion). 
2016 KIMBLE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT 197 
that if Brulotte was truly an antitrust case they could very well have decided 
Kimble in the alternative.157  However, when one examines the holding in 
Brulotte, it is clear that antitrust considerations were the root of the 
decision.158 
The Court in Brulotte believed that patent licensing agreements 
including post-expiration royalties were an attempt by the patentee to 
continue extracting benefits from the patents after the monopoly power had 
expired.159  In addition, by adopting the per se ban against such royalty 
arrangements, the Brulotte Court believed it was offering protection to the 
free market from undue monopolistic influence.160  Finally, the Brulotte 
Court recognized the right of patent owners to leverage their monopoly 
power during the patent term, but that post-expiration royalties were akin to 
extending that power indefinitely.161  Clearly, the Brulotte Court was deeply 
concerned that patent holders could extend their monopoly right in 
perpetuity. 
Nowhere in the Brulotte decision did the Court discuss construction of 
statutory provisions.162  A typical exercise of statutory construction would 
utilize traditional canons and methods to determine the intent behind the law 
and resolve ambiguities in the text.163  A court’s approach to statutory 
construction can vary depending on what controlling theory the court utilizes 
(“textualism, intentionalism, [or] pragmatism”), which will alter how the 
court analyzes the legislative intent behind the statute in question.164  The 
Brulotte Court made no mention of a particular theory through which they 
analyzed a statute, nor utilized any sort of textual analysis or discussion.165  
The only mention of statutory provisions was a brief quotation of: (1) a 
                                                          
 157.   Id. at 2412 (“If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might answer both 
questions as Kimble would like.”).  
 158.   Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32–33 (1964). 
 159.   Id. at 32 (“The contracts [for post-expiration royalties] are, therefore, on their face a bald 
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device were available to patentees, the free market visualized for the post-expiration period would be 
subject to monopoly influences that have no proper place there.”). 
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 162.   See generally id. at 29–34. 
 163.   Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 
343 (2010) (“Statutory construction has a vocabulary consisting of rules of thumb that are said to 
allow readers to draw inferences about the meaning of a particular statute.”).  
 164.   Id. 
 165.   See generally Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 29–34. 
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portion of Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress the 
right to grant inventors temporary monopoly rights for their inventions; and 
(2) a single sentence from 15 U.S.C. § 154 highlighting the temporary 
monopoly term granted to inventors.166  The Brulotte opinion’s clear text 
shows that the per se ban was based on the fear of extending the patent 
monopoly beyond the expiration date, and not on statutory construction.  In 
fact, as the dissent in Kimble argued, there is no statutory provision that 
“forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration royalties.”167 
2. If the Kimble Court Correctly Reviewed Brulotte as an Antitrust 
Case, They Would Have Found That Post-Expiration Royalties Do 
Not Impermissibly Extend the Patent Monopoly. 
The majority in Kimble should have viewed the decision in Brulotte as 
one steeped in antitrust concerns, and evaluated those concerns based on 
established economic principles.  Patent rights give the inventor “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention,”168 but only for a statutorily proscribed period.169  The right of 
exclusion is the monopoly power wielded by the patent owner, and once the 
patent expires he or she holds no legal power to prevent others from using or 
producing the invention.  Once Kimble’s patent expired, the only legal right 
he possessed was the contractual agreement with Marvel to receive 3% 
royalties for as long as Marvel continued to make its product. 
Hypothetically, if toy manufacturer X began making a similar Web 
Blaster toy, neither Kimble nor Marvel would have the right to pursue legal 
recourse against X.  The patent would have expired, and there would be no 
exclusionary (monopoly) power possessed by Kimble or Marvel to prevent 
X from making and selling a Web Blaster.  The main change for Kimble 
would be the amount of payment he would receive from Marvel.  Because 
Marvel would not be the exclusive purveyor of the Web Blaster, their market 
share would decrease.  Kimble would still receive 3% royalty payments, but 
more competition in the market would gradually decrease the payment 
amounts.  The dissent generally discussed this concept in Kimble,170 and has 
                                                          
 166.   See id. at 30 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, which states Congress has the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).  
 167.   Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 168.   35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (Supp. 2014).  
 169.   35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2014). 
 170.   Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“As the Court 
understood such an arrangement, the patent holder leverages its monopoly power during the patent 
term to require payments after the term ends, when the invention would otherwise be available for 
 
2016 KIMBLE V. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT 199 
been discussed by courts in other patent licensing decisions as a reason for 
doubting Brulotte’s antitrust concerns.171  Scholarly articles have also 
criticized Brulotte’s holding to this effect.172 
The Brulotte per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent licensing 
agreements is based on an unfounded fear of monopoly extension.  If the 
majority in Kimble had analyzed this as an antitrust issue (as the Court in 
Brulotte did) they surely would have overturned the per se ban.  Instead, the 
Court incorrectly viewed Brulotte as an exercise in statutory construction, 
and as a result, royalties in patent licensing agreements are affected by an 
economically debunked justification. 
3. Since Brulotte Was an Antitrust Case, Not Statutory Interpretation, 
the Kimble Court Should Have Employed the Rule-of-Reason 
Approach. 
Since Brulotte was a decision based on antitrust concerns, the per se ban 
should have been abandoned for the rule-of-reason approach, the default 
standard employed by courts when dealing with antitrust allegations.173  
Here the rule-of-reason approach would have empowered the Court to 
investigate the royalty agreement between Kimble and Marvel and its effect 
on the superhero toy industry.  As discussed in Part III(A)(2), because 
Kimble and Marvel no longer held any legal patent rights post-expiration, it 
is unlikely the Court would find that Kimble continued to exert his 
exclusionary right on the market.  Of course, the Court could still have found 
the arrangement to be problematic.  However, this would have been a result 
of a detailed, factual, and specific inquiry into the relevant market, not on a 
blind per se prohibition. 
B. Implications of Upholding the Per Se Ban 
Affirming the per se ban on post expiration royalties preserved a 
burdensome rule, which will lead to many undesirable policy consequences.  
Patent licensing agreements vary in scope and complexity across a myriad of 
industries.  Preventing companies and inventors from entering into patent 
licensing agreements that include post-expiration royalties will create an 
industry of economic inefficiency and unnecessary contractual complexity.  
                                                          
free public use.  But agreements to pay licensing fees after a patent expires do not ‘enlarge the 
monopoly of the patent.’”).  
 171.   See, e.g., Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 172.   See & Caprio, supra note 88, at 838–54, and accompanying text.  
 173.   State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).  
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Less efficient operations and higher contracting cost will damage progress 
and innovation and can lead to unjust results for unsophisticated parties. 
1. The Brulotte Per Se Ban on Post-Expiration Patent Royalties Is a 
Rigid Rule Governing Complex Agreements, and Does Not Take 
into Account All of the Circumstances Surrounding the Transaction. 
The Supreme Court has addressed similar per se doctrines in the past 
and subsequently has replaced them with more holistic analysis standards.174  
In Illinois Tool Works, Inc., the Court reviewed a per se ban on tying 
arrangements175 in patent licensing agreements.176  The justification for the 
per se ban was similar to the one espoused by the Brulotte Court—that such 
an arrangement gave the patent holder greater market power which was a 
per se violation of antitrust laws.177  The presumptions for these agreements 
assumed that “by tying the purchase of unpatented goods to the sale of the 
patented good, the patentee was ‘restraining competition.’”178  The Court 
pushed back against this presumption, and concluded that “while some such 
arrangements are still unlawful” the conclusion that the patent holder exerts 
impermissible monopoly power on the market “must be supported by proof 
of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption 
thereof.”179 
Discarding the per se ban in Illinois Tool Works did not legalize tying 
arrangements.  Instead, the Court ensured that complex business agreements 
received a fair amount of scrutiny to decide whether impermissible 
monopoly power was truly exerted on the market.  By allowing such 
agreements, the Court empowered individuals and businesses to contract 
freely without a per se obstacle blocking an otherwise economically efficient 
arrangement. 
By upholding the Brulotte per se ban on post-expiration royalties, the 
Kimble Court left in place a barrier to possible economic efficiency.  In 
some instances, extending patent royalties is the only thing that is 
economically possible.  Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, in 
conjunction with other medical research centers, filed an amicus brief in 
                                                          
 174.   See generally Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).   
 175.   See supra note 72. 
 176.   Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. at 31.  
 177.   Id. at 37–38.  
 178.   Id. at 38 (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942)). 
 179.   Id. at 42–43.  The Court noted that relevant evidence to prove the presumption included a 
definition of the market in which the patent holder operates, and proof that the patent actually 
confers him or her greater power within the defined market.  Id. at 45–46. 
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support of Kimble that argued this point.180  Medical research facilities 
conduct extensive research for new pharmaceutical drugs and treatments to 
various medical conditions.181  Often, these new drugs and treatments take a 
large amount of time and expense in the development stages.182  For both 
large and small companies alike, it makes economic sense to defer royalty 
payments during the development and testing stages for royalties after the 
drug goes to market—oftentimes after the patent term has expired.183 
If the Court utilized an analysis standard like the one seen in Illinois 
Tool Works, these agreements could be critically examined to determine if 
the post-expiration royalty structure was extending the patent monopoly of 
the medical research center beyond the patent term.  The Court would still 
be able to strike down the agreement if they found the agreement to evoke 
antitrust concerns.  However, by upholding the Brulotte per se ban, the 
Kimble Court placed a barrier in front of companies preventing them from 
constructing efficient patent licensing agreements. 
2. The Per Se Ban Subjects Unsophisticated Parties to Unjust Results, 
and Frustrates Original Contractual Expectations. 
The rigidity of the per se ban on post-expiration royalties exposes 
unsophisticated parties to unjust results simply because they are unaware of 
Brulotte.  In the case at issue, Kimble was an individual inventor entering 
into a licensing agreement with a major corporation.184  Both parties 
negotiated the royalty structure as a result of a settlement in a patent 
infringement case brought by Kimble against Marvel.185  It was not until 
later that Marvel claimed to have “stumbled across Brulotte.”186  The 
majority in Kimble commented that “Marvel must have been pleased to learn 
of it.”187  By affirming Brulotte, the Kimble Court opened the door for 
companies to “stumble across” Brulotte and use it as a reason for 
invalidating a negotiated, bargained-for agreement. 
A party as an individual inventor may not have the legal acumen or 
available funds to become legally sophisticated in the area of patent 
licensing agreements.  Coming to the table with a business (large or small) 
                                                          
 180.   Memorial Sloan Amicus 1, supra note 101, at 6–9. 
 181.   Id. at 9–12. 
 182.   Id. at 11.  
 183.   Id. at 8–12. 
 184.   Supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.  
 185.   Id.   
 186.   Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015). 
 187.   Id. 
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puts them at a disadvantage when negotiating their royalty structures.  If a 
company proposes a royalty structure that starts with small percentage 
payments and increases over time beyond the patent term when the product 
becomes more commercially viable, the individual may see that as an 
attractive offer since he or she will receive payments for as long as the 
company sells his or her product.  Now that Brulotte’s per se ban on post-
expiration royalties has been upheld, all that it takes for the company to 
withhold its payments is to “stumble across” Brulotte.  Meanwhile, the 
unsophisticated party is left with a fraction of what his patented product is 
worth in the market.  Brulotte’s per se ban frustrates an unsophisticated 
party’s contractual expectations, and makes “stumbling across” Brulotte a 
good business strategy for sophisticated companies. 
3. The Per Se Ban on Post-Expiration Royalties Thwarts the Purpose of 
the United States Patent System. 
One of the major goals of the patent system is to incentivize innovation 
by allowing inventors to (temporarily) reap the benefits of their labor.188  As 
discussed in Part III(B)(2), the Brulotte per se ban injects added complexity 
into already complicated agreements—particularly in the medical research 
and biotechnology fields.  In these fields, immense amount of time and 
money are needed to develop new drugs and technology.  Considering the 
considerable time and expense necessary to contract around Brulotte’s per se 
ban,189 individuals may leave the industry all together upon discovering that 
they can not get adequate returns on their investment through licensing 
agreements.  The goal of the patent system is to spur innovation, and if 
individuals leave an industry because they cannot be economically viable 
due to Brulotte’s per se ban, then the Court has thwarted the goals of the 
patent system. 
A company’s economic interest is not the only thing damaged by 
Brulotte’s per se ban.  For example, smaller research companies may have to 
devote a majority of their funds to the development of a new drug or 
treatment.190  The choice of whether to pursue such research will hinge 
largely on the ability to commercialize their research in the future.  If the 
new drug or treatment will not be economically viable until after the patent 
has expired, the company will head in a new, more profitable direction, or 
leave the industry all together.  While the economic interests of the company 
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 189.   See infra Section III(B)(4).  
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are surely damaged, the public at large will be deprived of new innovative 
medical technology.  In a market-driven society, the eventual 
commercialization of research and development is what incentivizes large 
up-front investment.  If a per se ban on post-expiration royalties makes it 
unlikely that a company will reap financial gain, the public loses access to 
innovative medical advances and technology. 
4. A Per Se Ban on Post-Expiration Royalties Does Not Effectively Bar 
Such Agreements. 
The majority in Kimble went as far as to outline how “parties can often 
find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve those same ends.”191  
For instance, a licensing agreement can provide for post-expiration royalty 
payments, so long as they are payments resulting from profits acquired prior 
to the expiration of the patent.192  This practice, however, merely amortizes 
royalty payments during the patent term over a period extending beyond the 
patent’s expiration.  It still does not permit the patentee to collect royalty 
payments from the licensor based on post-expiration use of the licensed 
patent.  Therefore, it really is not a workaround to the per se ban at all.  
Furthermore, in a licensing agreement comprised of multiple patents, parties 
can contract for royalty payments until all of the patents have expired.193  
Finally, parties can continue royalty payments post-expiration as long as the 
royalty rate is attached to a “non-patent right.”194 
While these options are available, requiring parties to investigate and 
utilize such workarounds is costly, and results in economic waste.  
Furthermore, if a company is not as sophisticated in their contract drafting 
capabilities (e.g. a small start-up versus a global corporation), the 
complexity of properly drafting around Brulotte may result in voided 
licensing agreements and increasing amounts of litigation.  The fields of 
medical research and biotechnology are exponentially more complicated 
relative to the agreement between Kimble and Marvel (a license for a single 
utility patent). 
BioTime, Inc., a biotechnology company, argued these points in their 
amicus brief based on their significant experience with patent licensing 
                                                          
 191.   Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2408.  
 192.   Id.  See also Brulotte v. Thys. Co., 369 U.S. 29, 31 (1964). 
 193.   Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2408.  See also Brulotte, 369 U.S. at 30.  
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transactions.195  In their field of scientific research, regenerative medicine, 
the scope of patent licensing agreements often encompasses a high number 
of patents and patent applications simultaneously.196  At the outset of the 
agreement, the future scope of these patents and patent applications may not 
be entirely known.197  Intellectual property licensing agreements such as 
these are inherently difficult to define because they do not involve easily 
discernable rights and products as seen in licensing agreements for real 
property.198  Because of this uncertainty, these agreements may opt for lower 
royalty payments at the outset in lieu of royalty payments after the product is 
actually commercially viable.199  By upholding the Brulotte rule, the Kimble 
Court injects even more complexity into an already convoluted transaction. 
Research companies such as BioTime, Inc., must now attempt to utilize 
one of the workarounds to the Brulotte per se ban on post-expiration 
royalties while at the same time dealing with the uncertainty of the scope of 
their intellectual property in the future.  Because of these uncertain 
agreements, a company may end up doing all of the upfront research, 
investment, and labor, and reap none of the commercial rewards. 
C. A Federal Statute Governing Post-Expiration Royalties 
The per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent agreements is a 
rigid bar to efficient economic contracting, and will have negative policy 
implications.  The contractual workarounds outlined by the majority in 
Kimble are insufficient since they require increased legal sophistication and 
economic investment from contracting parties.  While the Supreme Court in 
Kimble incorrectly found Brulotte to be an exercise of statutory 
interpretation, the antitrust sentiments espoused by the Brulotte Court are 
valid concerns.  Monopolistic actions and restraint of trade go against the 
ideals of the free market and should be policed.  However, a patent licensing 
agreement including post-expiration royalties does not per se result in 
extension of the patent monopoly beyond its expiration date.  In response, a 
new federal statute should be enacted that enables parties to freely contract 
for use and profit of a patented invention, while empowering the courts to 
review patent licensing agreements in light of relevant antitrust concerns. 
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1. Patent Licensing Agreements Including Post-Expiration Royalties 
Should Be in the Purview of the Sherman Act. 
A patent by definition is a limited monopoly, granting the user the 
power to exclude all others from using, making, or selling the patented 
invention.200  Antitrust concerns arise when the owner of the patent attempts 
to extend the limited monopoly beyond the expiration date in perpetuity.  
This was the true concern of the Brulotte Court when faced with a patent 
licensing agreement that included post-expiration royalties.201  However, just 
because the licensing agreement could result in monopolization or restraint 
of trade does not mean such agreements should be illegal per se—especially 
when the courts have an existing statutory framework under which patent 
licensing agreements with post-expiration royalties could be evaluated. 
The Sherman Act was passed in the United States in 1890, and it 
reflected the anti-monopoly concerns originally combatted by the Statute of 
Monopolies.202  The implementation and enforcement of the Sherman Act 
largely resides in the judiciary due to its relative brevity as compared to 
other statutes.203  There is no statutory scheme in United States law that 
explicitly governs the portion of patent licensing agreements, which include 
post-expiration royalties.  Contract law principles may govern certain 
aspects of the agreements, but the post-expiration royalties are a question of 
antitrust law.  As a result, Congress should enact a federal statute that 
scrutinizes such agreements under the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
2. The Statutory Language Should Mirror the Brevity of the Sherman 
Act, and Direct Courts to Evaluate Patent Licensing Agreements 
with Post-Expiration Royalties as an Antitrust Case. 
The Sherman Act itself does not explicitly define what actions result in 
monopolization or restraint of trade, but it does explicitly state that these 
actions are illegal and proscribes penalties for violations.204  Mirroring the 
brief instruction given by Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the new 
federal statute should state that patent licensing transactions including post-
expiration royalties may result in violations of Sherman Act Sections 1 
and/or 2, and direct courts to utilize an antitrust analysis to examine the 
agreement.  For example: 
                                                          
 200.   See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 201.   See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.  
 202.   See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.   
 203.   See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 204.   See supra notes 58–61.   
206 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
Patent license agreements providing for post-expiration royalties are 
illegal if the royalty structure violates Sections 1 and/or 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  If such agreement is found to result in monopolization or restraint of 
trade, all relevant penalties under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act shall 
apply . . . . 
Enacting this new statute will allow parties to enter into patent licensing 
agreements without investing significant time and money into drafting 
around a per se ban on post-expiration royalties. 
Absent the per se ban, new technologies will have less barriers to 
market participation.  By deferring royalty payments, inventors who develop 
innovative technological advances will still enjoy the fruits of their labor 
even if the innovation is not marketable until long after the patent’s 
expiration date.  A new federal statute abolishing the per se ban on post-
expiration royalties will have a positive effect on innovation and reduce 
economic waste while empowering the court to police such agreements for 
monopolistic effects on the market.  There is a well-established body of 
antitrust law created by the judiciary that courts can rely upon to accurately 
and efficiently examine patent licensing agreements with post-expiration 
royalties for antitrust violations.205 
3. Using the Rule-of-Reason Approach, Courts Will Be Able to 
Determine if a Patent Licensing Agreement Including Post-
Expiration Royalties Actually Violates the Sherman Act. 
Once the new federal statute incorporates these patent licensing 
agreements into the Sherman Act’s framework, the courts will evaluate the 
agreements utilizing the rule of reason, the default standard for antitrust 
cases.206  Because antitrust cases necessitate a robust factual inquiry,207 
parties will have the opportunity to offer evidence to show that no 
monopolistic activity or restraint of trade occurred because of their 
agreement.  Courts will be able to evaluate the agreement in light of relevant 
factors including, but not limited to, the parties’ conduct, the market in 
question, each party’s role in the market, and the effect (if any) the licensing 
agreement has on competition within the market.208 
The rule of reason is a malleable analysis standard that will provide 
courts the flexible framework necessary to evaluate patent licensing 
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agreements from a myriad of different industries.  The patent licensing 
agreement in Kimble included a single utility patent, and thus would be a 
relatively simple analysis for the court.  In addition, the rule of reason would 
provide the courts with the tools necessary to evaluate complex licensing 
agreements from the biotech or medical research industries.  A federal 
statute abolishing the per se ban on post-expiration royalties in patent 
licensing agreements will have a positive effect on innovation and the 
economy and will direct the courts to utilize a well-developed antitrust 
evaluation system to analyze such agreements for violations of the Sherman 
Act. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Brulotte per se ban on post-expiration patent royalties endures 
today because the Kimble Court incorrectly viewed the Brulotte decision as 
an exercise in statutory construction.  The Kimble Court should have instead 
viewed Brulotte as an antitrust decision that necessitated the use of the rule-
of-reason approach.  Enacting a new federal statute that places patent 
licensing agreements with post-expiration royalties within the purview of the 
Sherman Act instead will allow parties to freely contract with one another 
without having to employ economically inefficient alternatives.  Each 
challenged agreement would be evaluated based on all of the factual 
circumstances and an analysis of the relevant market to be sure that antitrust 
laws were not violated.  Instead, the per se ban remains, and parties must 
endure a rigid per se barrier that results in economic inefficiency, stifling of 
innovation, and frustration of contractual expectations. 
 
